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Abstract
This paper studies a game of attack and interception in a network, where
a single attacker chooses a target and a path, and each node chooses a level
of protection. We show that the Nash equilibrium of the game exists and
is unique. It involves a mixed strategy of the attacker except when one
target has a very high value relative to others. We characterize equilibrium
attack paths and attack distributions as a function of the underlying network
and target values. We also show that adding a link or increasing the value
of a target may harm the attacker - a comparative statics effect which is
reminiscent of Braess’s paradox in transportation economics. Finally, we
contrast the Nash equilibrium with the equilibria of two variations of the
model: one where nodes make sequential protection decisions upon observing
the arrival of a suspicious object, and one where all nodes cooperate in
defense.
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Networks are often used to transport troops, bombs, drugs, contraband goods,
or viruses. Preventing or stopping the transportation of illegal and dangerous
objects on networks has long been the goal of army and police forces, customs and
cybersecurity agents. In this paper, we analyze a game between an attacker who
chooses a target node in the network and nodes who build up defense to deter the
attack.
This issue is connected to the vast literature in operations research on network
interdiction. Models of network interdiction involve two players: the interdictor
who changes the structure of the network (for example, placing detection devices,
destroying links or limiting capacities on links) and the evader who uses the net-
work to transport objects from a source to a sink. Typically, the game played has
a Stackelberg structure: the interdictor moves first and the evader second. The
objectives of the two players are diametrically opposed: the evader wants to max-
imize the flow of goods or minimize the length of the path between the source and
the sink whereas the interdictor wants to minimize the evader’s objective.
The problem that we focus on in this paper is different in two important re-
spects. First, a fundamental assumption of models of network interdiction is that
the source and sink are exogenously given. While this assumption is easily justified
in some contexts - for instance troop movements or delivery of goods to specific
locations, it is less likely to be justified for terrorist organizations, drug smugglers
or hackers. They typically choose endogenously their target destination(s), at least
partly to make it more difficult for their opponent(s) to prevent successful attacks.
Second, in our benchmark model, we consider a decentralized structure where each
node only cares about the possible damage to itself. Hence, there is no coordina-
tion in decisions about whether to defend a specific node. In particular, nodes that
believe that they are not likely to be attacked will not invest in defense.
We model a (n + 1)- person game between an attacker A and n target nodes.
Each target has a different value for the attacker. Each target node i is a distinct
player, and can invest in a technology to intercept the object with some probability
at a quadratic cost. The attacker is interpreted as a terrorist or criminal, whose
objective is to transport an object (a bomb, biological agent, contraband goods, or
a packet of drugs) from his location (labeled 0) to one of the defenders’ locations.
The defenders are interpreted as communities, cities or airports that can be targets
of terrorist attacks or markets for drugs or contraband goods. The defenders are
connected by an undirected network G which is interpreted as a transportation
network (e.g. airline or road network) that can be used by the attacker to transport
the object. The network also connects the attacker to the defenders. We take
the network to be exogenously given in the analysis. In our baseline model, we
assume that the detection technology involves a fixed cost. All players choose their
strategies simultaneously. Each node has to take into account the probability that
it is under attack as well as the decisions on defense of other nodes. For instance, if
a network is a tree and a node believes that there is a good chance that the attacker
will be intercepted by one of the predecessor nodes, then it is likely to spend less
on its defense. Similarly, the attacker has to take into account the defense plans
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of the nodes in order to maximize chances of a successful attack. The appropriate
solution concept for this situation of strategic interaction is Nash equilibrium.
Our main result shows that there is a unique Nash equilibrium in the baseline
model. We identify conditions under which this unique equilibrium will be in pure
strategies. Essentially, a pure strategy equilibrium can exist if and only if one
target node has sufficiently high value so that it is worthwhile to attack even if the
node is heavily defended. Otherwise, there will be a mixed strategy equilibrium.
Our proof of uniqueness also casts some light on the equilibrium strategies. We
show that the attacker will use only one path to attack a node in the support
even if there are possibly multiple paths of attack. The equilibrium attack tree
can easily be characterized, using the fact that if a node is preceded by several
targets, it will always be attacked through the preceding target with lowest value.
Equilibrium attack probabilities are characterized as the solution to a simple system
of equations.
We then go on to describe two kinds of comparative statics results. In one,
we discuss how the equilibrium outcomes change when an additional link is added
to the network. In the second type, we describe how the equilibrium outcomes
change when there is a small increase in the value of a target node. It turns
out that in both cases, the changes in equilibrium payoff to the attacker can be
counterintuitive. In particular, an additional link should increase the payoff of
the attacker since this gives the attacker more options of attack. Intuition should
suggest that since the attacker can always choose not to use the new link, it can
never be worse off in the network after the new link is available. However, we show
that this type of revealed preference argument is not valid in our model. We show
that an analogue of Braess’s Paradox can occur in our model - the new link must
be used in equilibrium and the attacker’s equilibrium payoff can be strictly lower!
A similar counterintuitive result can occur even in the second case - the attacker’s
equilibrium payoff may be strictly lower when the value of a node increases.
We go on to study a variation of the model, where nodes do not commit ex ante
to their interception strategy but instead choose how much to spend on defense
upon observing a suspicious package. In this version of the model, moves are
sequential and we compute the sequential equilibria of the extensive form game.
We first show that under relatively weak genericity assumptions, there cannot be
a mixed strategy sequential equilibrium when G is a tree. We characterize the set
of pure strategy targets in lines, and show that equilibrium is no longer unique:
the attacker can choose different targets, giving rise to different beliefs off the
equilibrium path.
Finally, we look at an alternative formulation where a single centralized agency
coordinates defense. In this case, all nodes - even nodes that are not targets - on
an attack path are defended. In contrast to the baseline model, the attacker may
use multiple paths of attack to the same target in a general network. We focus
on the line and show that the equilibrium is unique. We also identify conditions
under which all nodes in the line will be attacked in equilibrium and compare
the equilibrium outcomes under the cooperative and non-cooperative formulations.
Not surprisingly, the attacker is worse off in the case of centralized defense. We
show that all nodes but the first target are better off in the case of centralized
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defense, but that the first target may either be better off or worse off. Hence,
the first target may need to be subsidized to accept to participate in a centralized
defense scheme.
All proofs are given in an appendix.
2 Related literature
Our paper is related to two strands of the literature: the operations research litera-
ture on network interdiction and the economics literature on attack and defense in
networks. The extensive literature on network interdiction originated with Wollmer
[20]’s characterization of the arc to be removed to minimize the flow between a
source and a sink in the network. Three types of problems have been considered.
In shortest path interdiction, (Golden [13],) the objective of the evader is to min-
imize the length of the path between the source and the sink. In most reliable
path interdiction, (Washburn and Wood [19]), the interdictor places detection de-
vices on the edges, and the objective of the evader is to minimize the probability
of detection. In network flow interdiction, (McMasters anbd Mustin [16], Ghare,
Montgomery and Turner [11], and Fulkerson, Ray and Harding [10]), edges are
capacitated and the objective of the evader is to maximize the flow between the
source and the sink. The applications range from the disruption of enemy troop
movement (McMasters and Mustin [16] and Ghare, Montgomery and Turner [11])
to drug smuggling (Wood [21] and Washburn and Wood [19]) and the detection
of nuclear material (Morton, Pan and Saeger [17]). The literature is very clearly
summarized in Collado and Papp [4] and surveyed in Smith and Song [18].
Our model is closest to the detection game studied in Washburn and Wood
[19] where the interdictor and evader play a simultaneous game. The interdictor
chooses detection devices on edges and the evader chooses a mixed strategy over
paths. However, Washburn and Wood [19] assumes that the source and sink are
fixed. In the stochastic network interdiction problem (Cormican, Morton and Wood
[5]), this assumption is relaxed and source and sink are drawn from a stochastic
distribution. However, the distribution is exogenous and cannot be controlled by
the evader. Finally, a major point of departure between the operations research
literature and our paper stems from the questions asked and methods used. The
literature on network interdiction focuses attention on the complexity of the inte-
ger and linear programming problems involved in network interdiction and studies
algorithms to find exact or approximate solutions. Instead, we study attack and in-
terception as a game, provide an exact characterization of equilibrium and compute
the comparative statics effects of changes in the parameters of the problem.
Economists, using formal game theoretic models have also contributed to the
literature on conflict in networks. Some of these papers focus on network design
and emphasize tradeoffs between connectivity and ease of external disruptions. The
literature started with Dziubinski and Goyal [7], who model attacks on infrastruc-
ture, focusing on the trade off between cost of network defense and connectivity.
Dziubinski and Goyal [8] is also a model of attack and defense in infrastructure
networks. The defender chooses to protect “nodes” of a given network against
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attacks at some cost. A defended node is immune to attack while an undefended
node and all its links is removed if attacked. The focus is thus on the key nodes
that need to be defended in order to ensure efficient functionality. Goyal and Vigier
[14] models hacking and cybersecurity. The defender moves first, constructs the
network and chooses an allocation of defense resources to defend nodes. The at-
tacker then chooses an attack strategy, and how to spread through the network by
using successful resources. The paper uses a Tullock contest function to model the
outcome between the defender and attacker at any node. Successful attacks travel
from node to node in the network, the“contagion” representing the spread of com-
puter viruses. Cerdeiro, Dziubinski and Goyal [3] considers a version of the model
where defense is decentralized and the game is played, as in our model, between a
single attacker and defenders located at each node of the network. Finally, Bloch,
Dutta and Dziubinski [1] study network design in a different game of attack and
defense, where the objective of the defender is to hide an object inside the network.
While our paper considers, like the earlier literature, a game played between an
attacker and defender(s) on a network, our model is very different from existing
models. At least two differences are worth emphasizing. First, we do not express
payoffs as a function of the nodes captured and the residual network as in previous
models. Second, we explicitly take into account paths of attack as objects may be
intercepted before reaching their target - a feature which is absent from the existing
games of attack and defense in networks.
3 The Game
In our baseline model, we consider the following (n + 1)-person game between an
attacker (player 0 ) and n defenders. There is an exogenously given graph G on the
(n + 1) nodes. A path originating at 0 in the network, p, is a sequence of distinct
points i1, .., im such that g(0, i1) = g(i1, i2) = g(i2, i3) = .. = g(im−1im) = 1. A
path thus describes a sequence of moves along the transportation network, where
none of the locations are visited twice.
Each defender has a value bi, which is normalized to be smaller than 1. The
value bi captures the strategic or symbolic importance of a terrorist target or the
profitability of the market for drugs or contraband goods.
We assume that the defenders invest in a technology to intercept the object.
We let xi denote the probability that defender i detects and intercepts the object,
and assume that the technology allowing defender i to detect with probability xi




1 In the baseline model, each defender chooses its
detection probability independently.
The attacker chooses to attack a target i. In principle, there are several paths
between 0 and the target i, and the attacker can use a mixed strategy by ran-
domising between different paths of attack. However, we will soon show that the
1Alternatively, we could assume that each defender makes a binary decision to invest in a
fixed detection technology and that the fixed cost of the technology is random and drawn from a
uniform distribution over [0, 1]. Both models give rise to the same detection probability xi which
in the latter model is interpreted as the threshold value of the fixed cost for which the defender
chooses to invest in the detection technology.
5
attacker will choose a specific path to attack any given target. Of course, the at-
tacker can mix between different targets. If the attacker reaches the target i and is
undetected, he receives a payoff of bi and defender i suffers a cost −bi. We assume
that there are no spillover effects, so that all other targets j are unaffected by the
fact that the attacker has successfully reached his target i.
We provide an informal description of the game. The attacker’s (pure) strategy
is to choose a target i as well as the path(s) of attack from 0 to i. Each defender j’
s strategy is to choose the probability xj of intercepting the object. All strategies
are chosen simultaneously. The payoff of the attacker if his attack on i is successful
is given by bi, and is 0 if his attack is foiled. The payoff of defender i if he is
successfully attacked is given by −bi− 12x
2
i and the payoff of defender j who is not
attacked is given by −1
2
x2j . Observe that the game is not a zero-sum game because
the defenders incur an additional cost of investing in the detection technology.
Given any path p and i ∈ p, the set of predecessors of i in p is P (p, i) = {j ∈
p|j lies on the path between 0 and i}. Fix a defense vector x = (x1, . . . , xn). For
any node i contained in the path p, we let αi(p) denote the probability that the





so that the probability that the good reaches node i and is not detected at i is
given by
βi(p) = αi(p)(1− xi).
The expression βi(p) thus expresses the notion that if the attacker wants to
successfully attack target i along any given path p, then the object has to pass
undetected at all nodes preceding i on the path p.
To illustrate the model, consider a (hypothetical) situation where a terrorist
located in Baghdad plans to attack a target in Europe or the United States. Based
on data on airline routes from flightsfrom.com in December 2020, the following










We suppose that the cities can be partitioned into three groups according to
target values: cities in the Middle-East, cities in Europe and New York City. The
ranking within each group puts Dubai above Istanbul, Istanbul above Beirut, Beirut
above Amman and London above Paris. In order to capture this ranking, we assign








The objective of our analysis is to study which targets and paths are chosen by
the terrorist, and how the different cities respond by investing in defense technolo-
gies.
4 Equilibrium Analysis
In the benchmark model, we have assumed that the attacker and the defenders
move simultaneously. A Nash equilibrium is thus a probability distribution over
targets specifying as well the paths of attack, and a vector of investments (x1, ..., xn)
such that (i) the attacker chooses his optimal attack strategy given the vector
of detection probabilities (x1, ..., xn) and (ii) each defender i chooses her optimal
investment strategy given the investment strategies of the other defenders x−i and
the attacker’s strategy.
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Unless otherwise stated, we use the following generic Assumption throughout
the paper.
Assumption 1. For any two defenders i, j, bi 6= bj.
We start with a few preliminary Lemmas describing the best responses of the
attacker.
For any mixed strategy of the attacker, we use ∆ to denote the set of targets that
are attacked with positive probability.2 Fix also any vector of defense strategies
x = (x1, . . . , xn) satisfying the restriction that xi = 0 if i /∈ ∆.
On any path p, for any i, j ∈ p ∩∆, we will say that j is an immediate prede-
cessor of i in p given π if j ∈ P (p, i) and (P (p, i) \ {j})∩∆ ⊂ P (p, j)∩∆. That is,
j is an immediate predecessor of i if j is a predecessor of i and there are no other
predecessors of i in p ∩∆.
Lemma 1. Fix the defense investments x and consider any best response of the
attacker to x.
(i) If j is an immediate predecessor of i in p, then
bi(1− xi) = bj.
(ii) If i, j ∈ ∆ and there exist attack paths p, p′ such that i and j are the first
targets in paths p and p′, then
bi(1− xi) = bj(1− xj).
Lemma 1 is a direct consequence of the fact that the attacker must be indiffer-
ent between any target in the support ∆. We use this Lemma to derive another
important result on the equilibrium strategy of the attacker.
Lemma 2. For any two paths p, p′, if i is attacked along paths p and p′, then
P (p, i) ∩∆ = P (p′, i) ∩∆.
Lemma 2 shows that, without loss of generality, we can assume that any target
i is attacked from a single path p in equilibrium. If the attacker uses two paths p
and p′ to reach a target i, the two paths only differ on nodes which are not attacked,
and hence never invest in the detection technology. Hence the probability that the
attack is successful is identical along the two paths, βi(p) = βi(p
′). Therefore, we
can simplify notation considerably by identifying targets with the single path of
attack. So, we can characterize an equilibrium strategy of the attacker with the
probability distribution q over targets in ∆.
Moreover, since every target is attacked through only one path, the attacker
is connected to all targets in ∆ though a tree T ⊆ G rooted at 0. We also note
2By adopting this notation, we do not differentiate between different paths of attack to the
same target. We show below that this omission is without loss of generality since the attacker
will choose a unique attack path for each target.
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that we can now define predecessors of targets without reference to paths since
effectively there is only one path to each target. So, P (i) will denote the set of
predecessors in T . For any target i ∈ ∆ we let δ(i) denote the number of targets
in ∆ along the unique path connecting 0 to i in T . The integer δ(i) is interpreted
as the distance between the attacker’s node and target i. If a node i is the first
node attacked on an attack path, it has distance δ(i) = 0. By convention, we let
∆m be the set of all targets at distance m from the attacker:
∆m = {i ∈ ∆|δ(i) = m}.
Using the simpler notation, let us formally define the expected payoffs of the
attacker and defenders for any (n+ 1) tuple of strategies (q, x1, . . . , xn).








For later reference, we also derive the best response of any defender i to (q, x−i).
This is obtained from the first order condition for a maximum of equation 2, and
is
xi(q, x−i) = αiqibi (3)
We first note that a Nash equilibrium of the game of attack and interception
always exists by appealing to the Debreu-Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem.
Theorem 1. The game of attack and interception on a network always admits a
Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Our second result characterizes situations under which the equilibrium of the
game is in pure strategies.
Proposition 1. The game admits an equilibrium in pure strategies if and only if
there exists a defender i such that
(i) bi(1− bi) ≥ bj for all j such that there is a path p, i /∈ P (p, j).
(ii) bi ≥ bj for all j such that for all paths p, i ∈ P (p, j).
Proposition 1 shows that an equilibrium in pure strategies only occurs when one
of the targets has a value which is much larger than the value of any other target.
It is only in these very asymmetric situations that the attacker has an incentive to
concentrate his attack on one of the nodes which in turn will choose the highest
level of defense, while all other nodes remain unprotected.
We next show that the game admits a unique Nash equilibrium. A series of
Lemmas precedes the main result.
Lemma 3. Consider any equilibrium (q, x∗), with ∆ = {i ∈ N : qi > 0}. Then,
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1. Suppose that i ∈ ∆. Then, if j ∈ ∆ ∩ P (i), bj < bi.
2. Suppose that i ∈ ∆, and there exists a path between i and j in G which does
not intersect ∆. Then if bj > bi, we must have j ∈ ∆.
Lemma 3 first shows that along an equilibrium path, the values of targets must
be increasing, and that any defender which is preceded by another defender with
higher value cannot be attacked. However, Lemma 3 does not pin down the path
by which a target is attacked. The next Lemma helps us identify this path for a
particular target i.
Lemma 4. Suppose that i ∈ ∆m with m ≥ 1. Let k ∈ ∆ be an immediate
predecessor of i on the unique path from 0 to i in T . Let
J = {j ∈ ∆ there exists a path from j to i in G which does not intersect ∆}
Then bk < bj for all j ∈ J .
Lemma 4 shows that target i will be attacked from the target k with the lowest
value among all the targets for which there exists a path which does not intersect
∆. This Lemma is used to characterize the equilibrium attack paths whenever the
support ∆ is given.
Furthermore, once the attack paths are given, the equilibrium attack proba-
bilities qi, defense investments xi and equilibrium utility of the attacker U can be





















) if i /∈ ∆0. (7)∑
i
qi = 1, (8)
where k(i) denotes the immediate predecessor of i along the attack path.
To understand these formulas, note that the equilibrium investment levels are
obtained from the equations guaranteeing that the attacker is indifferent among
the targets in the support, so that
bi(1− xi) = U for i ∈ ∆0,
bi(1− xi) = bk(i) for i /∈ ∆0
providing two different expressions, whether i is the first target along an attack
path or not. The optimal choice of defense investments must satisfy equation (3)











Replacing xi with the values in equations (4) and (6) gives the expressions for the
equilibrium attack probabilities.
Because all probabilities qi are strictly decreasing functions of U , equation (8)
has a unique solution, establishing that the equilibrium probabilities are unique.
Hence, once the support ∆ is given, the equilibrium attack paths and attack prob-
abilities are easily characterized.
Theorem 2 shows that there is a unique equilibrium support ∆, and hence a
unique equilibrium. The proof relies on the following arguments. Suppose that
there were two different equilibrium supports ∆ and ∆′. As one node is attacked
under ∆ but not under ∆′, the equilibrium utility of the attacker must be at least
as large under ∆ than ∆′. But this implies that the support ∆′ must be strictly
contained in the support ∆. Next, we show that the same attack paths must
be used in the two equilibria, which, together with the fact that the equilibrium
utility is at least as large in the equilibrium with support ∆′, imply that the defense
investments and the equilibrium probabilities are lower under ∆′ than ∆. This final
observation leads to a contradiction, as the sum of probabilities is equal to one in
both equilibria, and the support ∆′ is strictly contained in ∆.
Theorem 2. Given Assumption 1, the game of attack and interception admits a
unique Nash equilibrium.
We illustrate the unique Nash equilibrium of the game in the terrorist attack
application. All cities are attacked with positive probability. Amman, Beirut and
Dubai, Istanbul are all directly connected to Baghdad. The city with the lowest
value that has direct connection to New York is Istanbul, the city with lowest value
that has a connection to London is Amman and the city with lowest value that



















We note that the three cities of London, New York and Paris are all attacked
with probability greater than 20%, whereas the four cities in the Middle east are
attacked with probabilities at most equal to 10%. Interestingly, even though the
difference in target values between two consecutive cities in the Middle East is as
small as the difference between London and Paris, the difference in attack proba-
bilities is much larger: it is on average 2.43% whereas the difference between Paris
and London is only 0.39%. This reflects the fact that cities in the Middle East also
serve as stops on the path to other targets, which magnifies the effect of differences
in defense investments, and results in larger differences in attack probabilities.
The difficult step in the characterization of equilibrium is not the identification
of the attack paths nor of the equilibrium distribution, but the characterization of
the support of attacks ∆. However, the support can easily be derived when the
underlying network is a line.
Proposition 2. Let G be a line and b1, ..., bn the increasing sequence of targets










Then the equilibrium support is ∆ = {bi, ..., bn}.
Proposition 2 identifies the first target in a line. If bn(1− bn) ≤ bn−1, then there








≤ 1. By Proposition 1, the equilib-
rium is a pure strategy equilibrium. Otherwise, if bn(1−bn) < bn−1, then there exists









hence the first target in the equilibrium attack path. Interestingly, the condition
identifying target i as a first target does not only depend on the value of the target,
but on the value of all subsequent targets in the path. The identification of the








for all targets i in the increasing subsequence.
One case of interest is the case where the difference in values among two con-




of the first target is then given by the first value i such that






is the jth harmonic number.
5 Comparative Statics
In this section, we discuss the consequences of changes in the parameters of the
model on the equilibrium outcomes. We consider two comparative statics exercises.
We first analyze the effect of an addition of a single link to the original network G.
We then analyze the effect of an increase in the value attached to a single node. In
both cases we consider “small” changes, such that the support of the equilibrium
attack distribution does not change.
5.1 Adding a Link
We first look at the consequences of adding a link ij to the original network G,
restricting attention to the case where the link is added either between two targets
i and j in the support which are previously unconnected, or between the attacker’s
node 0 and a target node i. Without loss of generality, if i and j are in the support,
suppose that the value of target i is smaller than the value of target j, bi < bj. We
first observe that the addition of a link may lead to a change in the attack support.





Let the value of the targets be b1 = 0.275, b2 = 0.3, b3 = 0.4. It is easy to check
that in equilibrium, all three targets belong to the attack support and are attacked
with probabilities q1 = 0.02, q2 = 0.29, q = 0.69. Now suppose that we add a link




After the addition of a direct link between the attacker and target 3, target 1 is
no longer attacked, and the attacker’s equilibrium attack distribution is given by
q2 = 0.24, q3 = 0.76.
As shown in the proof of Theorem 2, for a fixed support, there is a unique
equilibrium attack path tree. Either the addition of the new link does not affect the
equilibrium path tree, in which case the equilibrium is identical to the equilibrium
with the original network, or the addition of the new link affects the equilibrium
attack path tree. In the latter case, it must be that the attack path between i and
j uses the new link ij. By the construction of the equilibrium attack path tree,
it must be that bi < bk where k was the immediate predecessor of j in the attack
path tree of the original network G. Furthermore, all other nodes must remain
connected to the same nodes as in the original network G and hence have the same
immediate predecessors.
We first consider a situation where both i and j belong to the support and
bi < bk < bj where k is j’s immediate predecessor in the equilibrium attack path
tree of the initial graph G.
Proposition 3. Consider the addition of a link between two points in the support,
i and j with bi < bj. Then xj goes up, and all xl remains constant for any node l
in ∆ \∆0. In addition
• If bi + bk > bj, then U goes up, xl goes down for any node l in ∆0, and the
attack probability qj goes up while all other attack probabilities ql go down.
• If bi + bk < bj, then U goes down, xl goes up for any node l in ∆0, and the
attack probability qj goes down while all other attack probabilities ql go up.
Next, we consider the addition of a link between the attacker and a node i in
the support where k is i’s immediate predecessor of i in the original network G.
Proposition 4. Consider the addition of a link between a node in the support,
node j, and the attacker. Then for all nodes j ∈ ∆ \∆0, xj remains constant. In
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addition, if bj > 2bk, U goes down, xl goes up for all first targets l in the original
graph, and the probabilities ql go up for all nodes l 6= j, while the probability qj goes
down.
Propositions 3 and 4 show that the addition of a new link can lead to an increase
or a decrease of the equilibrium utility of the attacker depending on the values of
the targets. The fact that the addition of a new link may hurt the attacker is at
first glance counterintuitive since the attacker could choose not to use the new link.
However, the very existence of the new link changes the incentive structure of the
problem, modifying the incentives for the attacker and the equilibrium defenses
of the targets. This result is reminiscent of the Braess paradox in transportation
economics, [2] where congestion may increase with the addition of a new link in the
transportation network. As in the case of congestion in transportation networks,
the equilibrium behavior of all players is affected by the change in the infrastructure
network, causing the targets to increase their defense spending and making the
attacks less likely to succeed.
Propositions 3 and 4 also indicate that a new link between i and j hurts the
attacker when the value of the target, bj, is large, and results in an increase in the
attacker’s utility when the value of the target is low. More precisely, the addition of
a link between two nodes in the support increases the utility of the attacker when
the sum of the values of the two predecessors of j before and after the addition of the
link is greater than the value bj ; it decreases the utility in the opposite situation,
when the value bj is higher than the sum of the values of its predecessors. When
the new link connects the attacker to a node in the support, the situation is less
clear. We provide a sufficient condition, showing that if bj is greater than 2bk, the
addition of a new link results in a decrease in the utility of the attacker.
The results of Propositions 3 and 4 can be illustrated in a line with increasing
sequence b1 < ... < bn. For any target bj, there exists a threshold value bk such
that the addition of a new link between bj and bi > bk results in an increase in the
utility of the attacker whereas the addition of a new link between bj and bi < bk
reduces the utility of the attacker. When a new link between bj and 0 is formed,
the utility of the attacker goes down whenever bj > 2bk.
Propositions 3 and 4 also analyze the effect of the addition of a new link on
the attack probabilities. When the utility of the attacker goes up, the attacker
increases his attack probability at node j and reduces it at all other nodes. By
contrast, when the utility of the attacker goes down, the attacker decreases his
attack probability at node j and increases it at all other nodes.
In order to study the effect of the addition of the new link on the equilibrium
payoff of the targets, we need to sign the effect on the equilibrium defense invest-
ments, as payoffs are monotonically decreasing in the defense investments. We first
note that, in all circumstances, the utility of target j goes down after the addition
of a new link. Other nodes in ∆ \∆0 are not affected by the addition of the link.
First targets in ∆0 can either experience an increase or a decrease in utility, and
the effect is negatively correlated with the effect on the attacker’s utility. When
the addition of the link increases the attacker’s utility, it reduces the utility of the
first targets ; when it decreases the attacker’s utility, it leads to a higher utility for
the first targets.
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5.2 Change in value of a target
We next analyze the effect of an increase in the value bi for some target i ∈ ∆,
assuming that the increase is small enough so as not to affect the support ∆ nor
the attack path tree T . We distinguish between an increase in the value of a node
which is not a first target and the increase in the value of a node which is a first
target.
We first study the effect of an increase in the value of a node which is not a
first target.
Proposition 5. Consider an increase in bi with i ∈ ∆ \∆0. Then xi goes up, xl









> 0, then U goes up, xj goes down for all j ∈ ∆0,
qj goes down for all j which are not equal to i or immediate successors of i.







< 0, then U goes down, xj goes
up for all j ∈ ∆0, qj goes up for all j which are not equal to i or immediate
successors of i.
Next we analyze the effect of an increase in the value of a first target.
Proposition 6. Consider an in increase in bi with i ∈ ∆0. Then xl goes down for








, then U goes up, xj goes down for all j 6= i ∈ ∆0, qj goes






< −1, then U goes down, xj goes up for all j 6= i ∈ ∆0, qj
goes up for all j which are not equal to i or immediate successors of i.
Propositions 5 and 6 show that, as in the case of the addition of a new link,
an increase in the value of a target bi can either increase or decrease the attacker’s
utility. The fact that the attacker is hurt when the value of the target increases may
come as a surprise, but can easily be interpreted. A higher target leads to larger
defense investments. Hence, the effect of an increase in the value of the target on
the attacker’s utility depends on the elasticity of the node’s defense investments
with respect to the target’s value. If this elasticity is high, the attacker will be hurt
by the increase in the target’s value ; if the elasticity is low, it will benefit from
that increase. In fact, even in the simplest case of a single node with value bi, the
equilibrium utility U = bi(1− bi) is non-monotonic in the value of the target, and




The same non-monotonicity of the attacker’s equilibrium payoff with respect
to the target’s value arises in more complex networks, as shown in the following
Example, which considers a star with three nodes.
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Let the hub values be given by b2 = 0.5, b3 = 0.6. The following graph shows
how the expected utility U varies with b1:
In[3]:= Solve [q + (b2 - b) / (b2^2 * (1 - q * b)) + (b3 - b2) / (b3^2 * (1 - q * b)) == 1, q]
Solve : Solve was unable to solve the system with inexact coefficients . The answer was obtained by solving a
corresponding exact system and numericizing the result .
Out[3]= q 




0.166667 3. + 3. b + 9. + 64. b - 135. b2 
b

In[1]:= b2 = 0.5
Out[1]= 0.5
In[2]:= b3 = 0.6
Out[2]= 0.6
In[3]:= f[b_] := b * (1 - 0.16667 * (3 + 3 * b - Sqrt [9 + 64 * b - 135 * b^2]))
In[4]:= Plot [f[b], {b, 0, 0.5}, AxesLabel  {b1, U0}]
Out[4]= 











0.16666666666666666` 3.` + 3.` b + 9.` + 64.` b - 135.` b2 
b

Figure 1: Attacker’s utility as a function of b1 in a star
The effect of an increase in b1 on U0 is not monotonic. For small values of b1,
an increase in b1 increases the expected utility of the attacker, but that for a large
value of b1, an increase in b1 reduces the expected utility of the attacker.
Propositions 5 and 6 generalize this intuition to general networks. When the
value of an interior target (a target which is not a first target) increases, the ef-
fect on the attacker’s utility depends on the value of the target, of its immediate
predecessor and immediate successors. If the value of the target, compared to its
immediate predecessor and successors, is relatively small, the attacker’s equilibrium
utility increases ; if the value of the target is relatively large, the attacker’s equi-
librium utility decreases. For a first target, the effect on the attacker’s equilibrium
utility depends on the difference between the value of the target and its immediate
successors. Again, the attacker’s equilibrium utility increases when the value of the
target is low and decreases when the value of the target is high. As in the previous
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comparative statics exercise, when the change involves a first target, there exists
a region of parameters for which we cannot ascertain the sign of the effect of the
change in the target’s value on the attacker’s equilibrium utility.
We provide an illustration of the condition of Proposition 5 in a line with
increasing sequence b1 < .. <, bn. Consider the effect of an increase in the value of
















(b− δ)(b− 2δ)(b+ ε)2 − (b− ε)b3
b3(b+ ε)2
.
Hence the sign of ∂q
∂bi
is the same as the sign of
B = (b− ε)b3 − (b− δ)(b− 2δ)(b+ ε)2.
We check that B is increasing in δ. For δ = 0, B = −3εb − εb2 < 0. For δ = ε,
B = 3ε2b+ 2ε3 > 0. Hence, there exists δ̄(ε, b) ∈ [0, ε] such that
• ∂U
∂bi
> 0 if δ ≤ δ̄(ε, b)
• ∂U
∂bi
< 0 if δ ≤ δ̄(ε, b)
Note in particular that if the difference in values between bi+1 and bi and bi and
bi−1 are equal, δ = ε, then
∂U
∂bi
< 0, so an increase in bi results in a decrease in the
expected payoff for the attacker.
Propositions 5 and 6 also show that an increase in the value of the target can
have different effects on the equilibrium attack probabilities. Whenever the at-
tacker’s expected utility increases, the attack probabilities of all nodes but node
i and its immediate successors go down ; whenever the attacker’s expected utility
increases, the attack probabilities of all nodes but node i and it immediate succes-
sors go up. Note however that this result only signs the effect of an increase in bi
on the sum of attack probabilities on i and its immediate successors. If node i is
not a final target, one cannot precisely ascertain the sign of the effect of an increase
in bi on the attack probability on node i.
Turning to the expected payoff of the defense nodes, Propositions 5 and 6 show
that all immediate successors of node i benefit from the increase in the value bi
whereas other interior nodes j 6= i are unaffected by the change. First targets
j 6= i can either experience a decrease in equilibrium payoff (when the attacker’s
expected utility increases) or a decrease in equilibrium payoff (when the attacker’s
expected utility decreases). The effect of an increase in bi on the equilibrium utility
of node i is always negative when i is an interior target, but can either be positive
or negative when i is a first target.
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6 Sequential game
In the benchmark model, we implicitly assume that there are fixed costs of setting
up an interception protocol, and all targets decide simultaneously at the beginning
of the game whether to incur these costs. Hence nodes commit to an interception
strategy, and Nash equilibrium is the appropriate solution concept.
We now consider a different version of the game, where targets incur variable
costs of interception, and decide how much to spend on defense upon observing the
arrival of a suspicious package. In order to make the analysis more transparent,
we assume that there is no fixed cost. The game is now a sequential game where
(i) first, the attacker chooses a path and a target and (ii) every node chooses how
much to invest in interception when it observes a suspicious package. We assume




To illustrate the difference between the simultaneous and sequential games,




In the benchmark game, the attacker chooses a target in {1, 2, 3} and each
defender simultaneously chooses an interception level x1, x2, x3. The sequential












Notice that target 2 chooses an interception level on two branches of the extensive-
form game: when it is attacked and when it lies on the attack path to target 3.
The defender at node 2 is however unable to distinguish between the two situations,
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as the only observation it makes is the arrival of the suspicious package. As the
attacker will only choose one attack path, targets in general may be left off the
equilibrium play.
We use as our equilibrium concept the sequential equilibrium of Kreps and Wil-
son [15]. For completeness, we give below the definition of sequential equilibrium.
Consider a finite game in extensive form G with players i = 0, 1, 2..n,, hji ∈ Hi
is the jth information set for Player i ∈ {1, 2, ...n}, A(hji ) the actions available to
Player i at hji and x
j
i a decision node for i in h
j
i . Let βi be a behavioral strategy
for player i with βji ∈ ∆A(h
j
i ) a probability distribution over the actions available
to i at hji .
Let βiε be a behavioral strategy that places a positive probability of at least




i ) be the probability
of being at node xji , derived by Bayes’ Theorem from the strategies β, if information
set hji is reached.
An assessment (µ, β) is a sequential equilibrium if the following conditions hold:
1. Sequential rationality. The behavioral strategy βi is a best response to
β−i at every information set, given beliefs µ.
2. Consistency. There exist (βiε, µiε) such that for all i, limε→0((βiε, µiε) =
(βi, µi)
The use of this solution concept is necessary for two reasons. A target i might
be on the equilibrium path of the attacker but if the package arrives at i, this target
knows its predecessors have not been attacked. It must therefore update, by Bayes’
theorem, its probability of being a target. The second factor arises if player i is not
on the equilibrium attack path but the package arrives there. What can be inferred
about the probability of being attacked? To answer this question, we perturb the
actions at every information set to obtain a completely mixed strategy and use
Bayes’ theorem to calculate beliefs. We then take the limit of these beliefs as the
perturbations go to 0 and use these beliefs for evaluating the players’ behavioral
strategies. Note that there could be many different perturbations, and we only
need to select one to justify the beliefs.
It is well-known that sequential equilibria always exist (see Kreps and Wil-
son [15] Proposition 1 p. 876). We first prove that in any sequential equilibrium
the attacker must attack a single target under an additional assumption on target
values. Like our previous Assumption (Assumption 1) stating that all target val-
ues are different, the following Assumption holds generically for all target values
(b1, ..., bn).
Assumption 2. For all i, j ,
bi(1− bi) 6= bj
and
bi(1− bi) 6= bj(1− bj).3
3Note that the second part of Assumption 2 implies Assumption 1.
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Theorem 3. Suppose that Assumption 2 holds and that G is a tree. Then in any
sequential equilibrium, the attacker attacks a single target with probability one.
The intuition underlying this result is easy to grasp. The last target i along an
attack path updates her belief and thinks that she will be attacked with certainty,
thereby spending xi = bi in interception. Hence, the expected payoff of the attacker
at any final target is equal to αibi(1− bi). If the attacker attacks another target j
immediately before i on the equilibrium path to i, it will obtain an expected payoff
of αjbj(1 − bj). However, as αi = αj(1 − bj), for the attacker to be indifferent
between the two targets, the equality bj = bi(1 − bi) must hold, contradicting
Assumption 2. By a similar reasoning, if the attacker attacks two targets i and j
along different paths, the equality bi(1− bi) = bj(1− bj) must hold, violating again
Assumption 2.
Theorem 3 shows that, by contrast to the simultaneous game, all sequential
equilibria are equivalent to an equilibrium in pure strategies: the attacker attacks
a single target, which is the only node choosing positive interception expenses along
the equilibrium path. Hence, allowing for sequential observation of the arrival of
suspicious objects and letting defenders update accordingly their beliefs over the
attacker’s strategy makes it impossible for the attacker to randomize over targets
in equilibrium.
Our next result characterizes the sequential equilibria when the underlying net-
work G is a tree . We first establish the following Lemma. Define a branch to be
a sequence of nodes from node 0 to any leaf of the tree. Let B denote the set of
branches and B ∈ B denote a branch. Of course, there can be i ∈ B ∩B′.
Let P (i, B), S(i, B) denote respectively the predecessors and successors of i in
B. 4
Lemma 5. Consider any branch of G, labeled {, 1, 2 . . . , K} for convenience. There
exists i ∈ {1, ...K} such that
bi(1− bi) ≥ bj ∀j < i (9)
bi ≥ Πj−ik=1(1− bi+k)bj ∀j ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , K} (10)
Theorem 4. Suppose G is a tree. Then, i belonging to any branch B = {1, . . . , K}
is a target attacked in a pure strategy sequential equilibrium if and only if it satisfies
(i) Equations (9) and (10) for branch B.
(ii) for all j ∈ B′ ∈ B, B′ 6= B,
bi(1− bi) ≥ Πk∈P (j,B′)(1− bk)(1− bj)bj (11)
The proof specifies out-of-equilibrium beliefs that all nodes not on the equilib-
rium path will, in the event of the suspicious parcel reaching its location, believe
with probability one that they are under attack. This implies that any deviation
4 The set of predecessors of i can be defined without reference to the branch B. But, if
i ∈ B ∩B′, then the set of successors in B will be different from those in B′.
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will be checked to the maximum extent possible, and hence result in the lowest
possible expected payoff following a deviation. This results in a weakest possible
sufficient condition. The conditions specified in the theorem also turn out to be
necessary.
A simple construction shows how to locate a node satisfying the three condi-
tions. Let
I = {i|i satisfies equations 9 and 10 for some B ∈ B}
.
Let i∗ = argmaxi∈I(1 − bi)bi. Lemma 5 shows that I is nonempty and As-
sumption 2 establishes that i∗ is well-defined. It is now elementary to show that i∗
satisfies equation (11). For suppose j lies on a different branch B′ . Let k ∈ B′∩ I.
Then, since bi∗(1 − bi∗) > bk(1 − bk) and k satisfies equations (9 and (10) with
respect to j, i∗ must satisfy equation (11) with respect to j.
Theorem 4 characterizes the nodes which can be attacked in a sequential equi-
librium. The following example shows that for the same vector of target values
(b1, ..., bn) on a line, different nodes can be attacked in a sequential equilibrium.







). It is easy to check that both b1 and b3 satisfy equations (9) and (10).
Hence there exists an equilibrium where the attacker attacks target 1 because
b1 > (1−b2)b2 and b1 > (1−b2)(1−b3)b3. However, there exists also an equilibrium
where the attacker attacks target 3 because b1 < b3(1− b3) and b2 < b3(1− b3).
Example 3 thus shows another striking difference between the simultaneous
and the sequential games. While the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous game
is always unique, the sequential game may admit multiple sequential equilibria,
supported by different beliefs. In example 3, target 1 is attacked in an equilibrium
supported by both targets 2 and 3 believing that they are attacked with proba-
bility close to 1 off the equilibrium path. Target 3 is attacked in an equilibrium
where both preceding nodes believe, on the equilibrium path, that they will not be
attacked.
7 Cooperation in defense
In the benchmark model, each of the nodes chooses independently the level of
defense. We now consider an extension where all nodes cooperate in defense. The
game then becomes a two-person game played between an attacker A and a single
defender D whose objective is to minimize the sum of losses of all the nodes.
A major difference between the cooperative situation and the benchmark, de-
centralized, model is that the single defender D protects all nodes on attack paths,
including nodes outside the support, as she internalizes the positive externality of
defense of a node on all the targets attacked through that node. Furthermore,
because nodes outside the support are protected, the attacker no longer selects a
unique path to attack a given target. As the following example shows, in equilib-
rium, targets can be attacked through different paths.
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Example 4. Consider a network with three nodes, where node 3 can be attacked




Assume that b1 = 0.5 and b3 = 0.8. For different values of b2, the following are
equilibria of the game of attack and interception with cooperation in defense:
• If b2 ≤ 417 , D chooses defense investments y1 = y2 = 0.11 and y3 = 0.70, and
A attacks node 3 with probability 1.
• If 4
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. A attacks target 2 with probability r2 =
17b2−4
8(2−b2) , attacks 3 through node
1 with probability r31 =
1
2






< b2 ≤ 45 , D chooses defense investments y1 = y3, y2. A attacks target 2
with probability r2 and target 3 through node 1 with probability r3 = 1− r2.
This example shows that as long as b2 <
4
7
, the attacker uses the two paths






, the attacker uses two different paths where the set of predecessors in
the support are different. Along path 1, 3, there is no predecessor on the attack
path, and along path 2, 3, node 2 is a target preceding 3 on the attack path.
Example 4 shows that Lemma 2 does not hold when nodes cooperate in defense.
The attack paths do not necessarily form a tree, and the strategy of the attacker
must prescribe a probability distribution not only over targets but also over paths
leading to a target. The analysis of the game thus becomes more complex than
when nodes independently choose their level of defense, and in order to characterize
equilibrium, we restrict attention to lines.
Let us consider a line with an increasing sequence of target values b1 < ... < bn.
Let (y1, ..., yn) be the defense investments, ∆ the support of equilibrium, and ri
the probability of attack of a target i ∈ ∆. The objective of the defender is to























for all i ∈ N .
We first show that equilibrium defense investments are decreasing along the
line.
Lemma 6. For all i = 1, . . . , yn, yi ≥ yi+1 with equality holding iff ri = 0.
The intuition underlying Lemma 6 is easy to grasp. Because all attack paths
follow the line, for any probability distribution of the attacker, the expected loss
at node i is larger or equal to the loss at node i + 1, strictly larger if node i is
attacked with positive probability. Hence the defender puts a larger defense on
node i than node i + 1. The next Proposition shows that, as in the benchmark
model, the equilibrium support and probabilities are unique when nodes cooperate
in defense on the line.
Proposition 7. Suppose that G is a line. Then, there is a unique equilibrium of
the game where nodes cooperate in defense.
Our next results compare the equilibria of the game where nodes cooperate in
defense and when defense investments are chosen independently. We first compare
the equilibrium supports. Proposition 2 characterizes the equilibrium support in
the decentralized model. In Appendix B, we provide an algorithm to similarly
construct the support in the cooperative model. According to Lemma 3, in the
benchmark model, all nodes in the increasing sequence following the first target
are attacked with positive probability. Example 5 shows that this is not necessarily
the case when the nodes cooperate in defense.
Example 5. Consider a line with three nodes, labeled 1, 2, 3 with b1 = 0.5, b3 = 0.8,
0.5 < b2 < 0.8. In the noncooperative case, all three nodes belong to the support.
In the cooperative case, using the algorithm of Appendix B, ξ1 = 0.25 so that
i∗ = 1; the first node attacked is node 1. Next we compute ζ2(1) = 1 − 12b2 and













, then ζ2(1) > ζ3(1) and all nodes are attacked.
Example 5 shows that in the cooperative model, there can be ”gaps” in the
support of equilibrium: the attacker attacks nodes 1 and 3 but skips node 2 even
though the values b1 < b2 < b3 for an increasing sequence . In Example 5, the
equilibrium support is larger in the noncooperative model than in the cooperative
case. This may not always be the case, as shown in the next example:
Example 6. Consider a line with 6 nodes with b1 = 0.2, b2 = 0.21, b3 = 0.22, b4 =
0.23, b5 = 0.24 and b6 = 0.5. In the benchmark model, as b6(1 − b6) = 0.25 > bi
for all i ≤ 5, by Proposition 1, the only equilibrium is a pure strategy equilibrium
where the attacker attacks node 6 with probability 1. When nodes cooperate in
defense, using the algorithm of Appendix B, we compute ξ1 = 0.2, ξ2 = 0.174, ξ3 =
0.156, ξ4 = 0.144, ξ5 = 0.135, ξ6 = 0.183, so i
∗ = 1: the first node attacked in
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the support is node 1. Next we compute ζ2(1) = 0.048, ζ3(1) = 0.302, ζ4(1) =
0.507, ζ5(1) = 0.634, ζ6(1) = 0.902, so j
∗(i∗) = 6 and node 6 is the second (and
last) node attacked in equilibrium.
Examples 5 and 6 show that there is no general inclusion result comparing the
equilibrium support in the cooperative and noncooperative models. In our next
Proposition, we provide some welfare comparisons between the cooperative and
noncooperative models. The comparison assumes that all nodes are in the support
of the attacker’s equilibrium strategy in both the cooperative and noncooperative
cases.
In order to avoid confusion, let βci = (1−y1) . . . (1−yi), and βi = (1−x1) . . . (1−
xi),




denote the equilibrium expected loss suffered by node




be the equilibrium expected loss
suffered by node i in the cooperative case, and M =
∑n
i=1Mi.
Proposition 8. Let G be a line on n nodes and suppose that all n nodes are attacked
in both the cooperative and non-cooperative cases. Then, the following are true.
(i) Mi > Li for i = 2, 3 . . . , n− 1 and Mn = Ln.
(ii) M > L
(iii) A’s expected payoff is strictly higher in the benchmark model.
This result shows that nodes 2 to n − 1 always benefit from coordinated de-
fense, while node n ’s expected loss is the same under both the centralized and
decentralized defense cases. The attacker always prefers the decentralized defense
scenario whereas the defenders collectively prefers the centralized scenario.
The only player whose welfare cannot easily be compared in the two cases is
the first target, node 1. The node is more heavily defended in the cooperative case
and so is less heavily attacked. But node 1 also spends more on defense and this
increases its cost of defense. The next example shows that the comparison can go
in both directions, depending on the values of the targets.
Example 7. As in example 5, consider again three nodes on a line with b1 = 0.5, b3 =
0.8. First, assume that b2 = 0.65.
Using U = (1− q1b1)b1 and equation 7










This quadratic equation in q1 can be solved to yield q1 = 0.247. Hence,
M1 = 0.116
On the other hand, r1 = (
1−b2
b2
)2 = 0.29 and
L1 = 0.197
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So, M1 < L1. However, choose now b2 = 0.78. Then, r1 = 0.0795, q1 = 0.374 and
M1 = 0.170 > 0.145 = L1
So, node 1’s expected loss in the cooperative case can be either higher or lower
than in the non-cooperative case.
Example 7 thus shows that the first target can be asked to increase its intercep-
tion level in the cooperative case to a point which decreases her payoff compared
to the decentralized scenario. This opens up the possibility that other nodes have
to subsidize node 1 (in case L1 >M1) in order to establish coordinated defense.
Of course, part (ii) of Proposition 8 shows that the aggregate benefits of nodes 2
to n− 1 are sufficiently large to more than compensate node 1’s loss if any.
8 Conclusions
This paper studies a game of attack and interception in a network, where a single
attacker chooses a target and a path, and each node chooses a level of protection.
We show that the Nash equilibrium of the game exists and is unique. It involves a
mixed strategy of the attacker except when one target has a very high value relative
to others. We characterize equilibrium attack paths and attack distributions as a
function of the underlying network and target values. We also show that adding
a link or increasing the value of a target may harm the attacker - a comparative
statics effect which is reminiscent of Braess’s paradox in transportation economics.
Finally, we contrast the Nash equilibrium with the equilibria of two variations of
the model: one where nodes make sequential protection decisions upon observing
the arrival of a suspicious object, and one where all nodes cooperate in defense.
While we treat in the analysis the network as exogenous, there are clearly sit-
uations where the defenders can design the network to prevent or fend off attacks.
In computer networks, the defenders can choose the architecture of the network. In
infrastructure networks, the defenders can block or eliminate edges, as considered
for example in the early literature on network interdiction. The analysis of endoge-
nous network design by defenders whose objective is to promote communication
while preventing attacks by adversaries is an important topic for future research.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Both equalities follow from the fact that the attacker must be indifferent
between attacking any two nodes in ∆. The first equality stems from the observa-
tion that if the attacker attacks the two targets i and j, he must receive the same
expected payoff by attacking i and j
biβi(p) = bjβj(p),
but because j and i are successive targets along path p,
βi(p) = βj(p)(1− xi),
yielding the result.
The second equality stems from the fact that if i and j are the first targets on
two paths p and p′, then αi(p) = αj(p
′) = 1, so that indifference implies
biβi(p) = bi(1− xi) = bjβj(p′) = bj(1− xj).
.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Let i be the first target which is attacked along the paths p and p′ and has
two different predecessors, j ∈ p ∩∆ and k ∈ p′ ∩∆. From the previous Lemma,
as j and k are both immediate predecessors of i, we must have
bj = bi(1− xi) = bk,
contradicting the fact that bj 6= bk for two different defenders j and k.
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Reinterpret the game as a game with continuous strategy spaces, where the
attacker chooses a point q in the n − 1 dimensional simplex and every defender i
chooses an investment xi ∈ <+. We will use the Debreu-Fan-Glicksberg Theorem
(Debreu [6], Fan [9] and Glicksberg [12]) to prove existence of an equilibrium in
pure strategies of this game.
First note that because bi ≤ 1, the strategy space of defender i can be restricted
to [0, 1], so that the strategy spaces of all players are compact, convex subsets of
Euclidean spaces. Second, an immediate inspection of equations (1) and (2) shows
that the payoffs of the players are continuous in the product of the strategies
(q, x1, ..., xn). The payoff of the attacker given by (1) is linear and hence quasi-
concave in q. Given that the quadratic cost function is convex, the payoff of any
defender i given by (2) is a concave function of xi and hence is quasi-concave.
All assumptions of the Debreu-Fan-Glicksberg Theorem are thus satisfied, and the
game admits an equilibrium in pure strategies, which is a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium of the original game of attack and interception.
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Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Suppose that there exists a defender i whose value satisfies the condition.
Consider the strategy profile where the attacker chooses qi = 1, and some path to
i, defender i chooses xi = bi and all defenders j 6= i choose bj = 0. The expected
payoff to the attacker is U0 = bi(1− bi).
Suppose 0 deviates and chooses q′ such that q′j > 0 where j 6= i as well as some
attack path p to j. We know that xj = 0. If this is to be a profitable deviation,
then we might as well set q′j = 1.
If i /∈ P (p, j), then
U0(q
′, x) = bj ≤ bi(1− bi)
If i ∈ P (p, j), then
U0(q
′, x) = bj(1− bi) < bi(1− bi) since bi > bj
Any defender j 6= i is attacked with probability 0 and hence optimally chooses
not to invest in the detection technology. Finally defender i chooses xi to maximize




resulting in the optimal decision x∗i = bi.
Suppose now that the game admits an equilibrium in pure strategies where the
attacker chooses qi = 1. As we just argued, defender i then optimally chooses a
detection probability x∗i = bi, resulting in an expected payoff U0 = bi(1 − bi) for
the attacker. Moreover, for all j 6= i, x∗j = 0. For any j such that there exists a
path p such that i /∈ P (p, j), a deviation to j gives 0 a payoff of bj. If for all paths
p, i ∈ P (p, j) then 0 gets a payoff of bj(1 − bi) by deviating. This establishes the
necessity of the conditions.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. To prove the first statement, suppose by contradiction that bj ≥ bi. Because
j precedes i , βj = αj(1− x∗j) ≥ αi > αi(1− x∗i ) = βi. Hence
βjbj > βibj ≥ βibi,
contradicting the fact that i ∈ ∆.
To prove the second statement, suppose by contradiction that j /∈ ∆. Then,
x∗j = 0. Let p = {i1, . . . , iK} where (i) i1 = i, iK = j and ikik+1 ∈ G. Suppose for
all k ∈ p, k 6= i, x∗k = 0 since k /∈ ∆. Then, βi = βj.
However, because j /∈ ∆ and i ∈ ∆, we must have
biβi ≥ bjβj,
resulting in a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 4
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Proof. Suppose by contradiction that there is j ∈ J with bj < bk. Since there is a
path from j to i which does not intersect ∆, x∗l = 0 for all targets l on this path
that are distinct from j and i. Hence, by attacking i through j would ensure that
βj = αi (12)
Since k and j are both in ∆,
βkbk = βjbj.
So, bj < bk implies that βj > βk = αi. But, equation (12) shows that the attacker
can increase his payoff by attacking i through the path from j to i in G .
.
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. : We first consider the case analyzed in Proposition 1 which describes the
conditions under which there can be a pure strategy equilibrium with only i being
attacked in equilibrium.
So, suppose there is i such that
(i) bi(1− bi) ≥ bj for all j such that i /∈ P (j).
(ii) bi ≥ bj for all j such that i ∈ P (j).
Suppose by contradiction that there is an equilibrium (q, x∗) such that qj > 0 for
some j 6= i. Then, x∗i < bi.
Let i ∈ P (j). Then, βi ≤ βj and bi > bj. So,
βibi > βjbj
This shows that a deviation to attacking i with probability one must be profitable
to i.
Next, suppose i /∈ P (j). Then, βi > (1 − bi) and so a deviation to attacking i
with probability one gives
βibi > (1− bi)bi ≥ bj > βjbj
This establishes uniqueness of equilibrium when the conditions for a pure strategy
equilibrium are satisfied.
Next consider the case where there is no pure strategy equilibrium. The strategy
of the proof is the following. We suppose that there are two equilibria E and E ′
with supports ∆ and ∆′. We first prove that ∆ = ∆′. We then show that the
sequence of targets on equilibrium paths have to be equal in the two equilibria
and finally establish that the equilibrium probabilities over the targets have to be
equal.
Step 1: The support of targets are equal ∆ = ∆′.
Suppose by contradiction that there exists i ∈ ∆ such that i /∈ ∆′.
Claim 1. The equilibrium utility in the two equilibria must satisfy: U ′ > U .
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Proof. Suppose first that there exists a path to i in G which does not intersect ∆′.
By attacking i along the path, the attacker obtains a payoff bi. As i /∈ ∆′, we must
have U ′ ≥ bi. In addition, as i is attacked with positive probability in equilibrium
E, x∗i > 0 and U = αibi(1− x∗i ) < bi, establishing that U ′ > U .
Suppose next that all paths to i in G intersect ∆′. This is in particular true
for the equilibrium attack path p to i in E. Let j be the last point in ∆′ along
path p. By Lemma 3, bj < bi. But then, as i /∈ ∆′, and there is a path between
j and i which does not intersect ∆′, by the second part of Lemma 3, i ∈ ∆′, a
contradiction.
Claim 2. The supports must satisfy: ∆′ ⊂ ∆.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that there exists i ∈ ∆′, i /∈ ∆. Applying the
same argument as in the proof of Claim 1, U > U ′, contradicting the fact that
U ′ > U .
Claim 3. For any i ∈ ∆′0, q′i < αiqi.
Proof. Pick a target i which is a first target along some attack path in the equilib-
rium E ′. As ∆′ ⊂ ∆, i ∈ ∆. Suppose first that i is a first target in equilibrium E
as well, i ∈ ∆0. Then, by Claim 1,
U ′ = bi(1− x∗
′
i ) > U = bi(1− x∗i ),











Next suppose that i ∈ ∆m for some m ≥ 1. Let p be the path in T from 0 to i
in E. Consider the equilibrium path p′ in T ′ from 0 to i in E ′.5
Consider equilibrium E. If there is no node in ∆ along the path p′, then by
deviating and attacking i along that path, the attacker obtains a payoff bi(1 −
x∗i ) > biαi(1 − x∗i ) as αi < 1 because there is another node attacked with positive
probability before i on path p. This shows that the path p′ must intersect ∆.
Let j be the last point in ∆ along the path p′. As i ∈ ∆′0, j /∈ ∆′. We consider
two cases. Suppose first that j is on the equilibrium attack path p. Then there
cannot be any other node between j and i in p. If there was a node k between j
and i in p, the attacker would have a profitable deviation by attacking i directly
from j along path p′, resulting in an expected utility biβj(1 − x∗i ) > biαi(1 − x∗i ),
as αi < βj. Hence, j is the immediate predecessor of i along path p. By Lemma 1,
bj = bi(1− x∗i ).
and by equation 3
x∗i = αiqibi.
5Of course, both paths p and p′ are in G.
32
Note that j /∈ ∆′ and there exists a path to j which does not intersect ∆′.
Hence,









Next suppose that j is not on the equilibrium attack path p to i and let k be
the last target preceding i on the equilibrium path p. Because p′ is a path from j
to i which does not intersect ∆, by Lemma 4,
bk < bj.
By Lemma 1
bk = bi(1− x∗i ),
so that
bi(1− αiqibi) = bk < bj ≤ bi(1− q′ibi),
This establishes
q′i < αiqi.
Claim 4. Suppose that m ≥ 1. Then for any i ∈ ∆′m, if j is the predecessor of i
on the equilibrium path p′ in E ′, j is also the predecessor of i on the equilibrium
path p in E.
Proof. Pick a target i ∈ ∆′m. We first claim that i /∈ ∆0. Suppose to the contrary
that i ∈ ∆0. Then there is a path to i which does not intersect ∆. As ∆′ ⊂ ∆,
the path does not intersect ∆′ either. But then because i ∈ ∆′m and m ≥ 1,
bi(1−x∗
′




i ), so that the attacker has a profitable deviation, establishing
a contradiction.
So let p ≥ 1 be the distance to i in equilibrium E. We claim that the immediate
predecessor of i on the two equilibrium attack paths must be identical. Suppose
by contradiction that j is the immediate predecessor of i on the equilibrium path
p′ and k 6= j the immediate predecessor of i on the equilibrium path p
For all l on p′ between j and i, as l /∈ ∆′ by the second part of Lemma 3 bl < bj.
Hence by the first part of Lemma 3 as bj ∈ ∆, bl /∈ ∆. Hence the subpath of p′
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joining j and i does not intersect ∆. Because ∆′ ⊂ ∆, the subpath of p joining k
and i does not intersect ∆′ either. But then, by Lemma 4 we obtain
bj < bk and bk < bj,
a contradiction. Hence the predecessor of i on the two equilibrium attack paths p
and p′ must be identical.
Claim 5. For all i ∈ ∆′, q′i < qi.
Proof. By Claim 3, the statement is true whenever i ∈ ∆′0. Now consider i ∈ ∆′m
with m ≥ 1. By Claim 4, i has a common set of predecessors i0, ..., im−1 in the two
equilibria.
By Lemma 1 for all m ≥ 1,
bim−1 = bim(1− α′imq
′




im = αimqim .
Now recall that α′i0 = αi0 = 1. We now prove by induction that α
′
im > αim for all
m ≥ 1. Let m = 1. By Lemma 3, q′i0 < qi0 so that
α′i1 = 1− bi0q
′
i0
> 1− bi0qi0 = αi1 .
.
Consider then the inductive step. Suppose that αim−1 < α
′
im−1 . Recall that















. By the induction hypothesis,
αim−1
α′im−1




Finally, using the fact that α′imq
′
im = αimqim , for all m ≥ 1,
q′i = q
′
im < qim = qi,
concluding the proof of the Claim.




















contradicting the fact that ∑
i∈∆′




Step 2: For any target i ∈ ∆ = ∆′, the sequence of preceding targets is
the same in the attack paths p and p′.
Claim 6. The set of first targets are identical, ∆0 = ∆
′
0.
Proof. Let i ∈ ∆0 and suppose i ∈ ∆′m with m ≥ 1. If there is a path to i which
does not intersect ∆′, then the attacker has a profitable deviation by attacking
i directly under E ′. Hence all paths to i must intersect ∆′. But then because
∆ = ∆′, the equilibrium path p to i must intersect ∆ contradicting the fact that
i ∈ ∆0. Hence ∆0 ⊆ ∆′0. Reverting the role of ∆0 and ∆′0, the same argument
shows that ∆′0 ⊆ ∆0
Claim 7. For any i ∈ ∆m,m ≥ 1, the preceding target is the same on path p and
on path p′.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that i has two different preceding targets, j and
k on the paths p and p′. Because ∆ = ∆′, the path from j to i does not intersect
∆′ and the path from k to i does not intersect ∆. Hence, by Lemma 4, bk < bj and
bj < bk, a contradiction.




For a fixed set of targets ∆ and an attack tree T , letting U denote the attacker’s
equilibrium utility, we characterize equilibrium attack probabilities and defense











where the first equations capture the attacker’s indifference over targets, the sec-
ond equations the nodes’ best response defense investments, and the last equation
35
guarantees that probabilities belong to the simplex. The attacker’s indifference








if i /∈ ∆0 with k(i) the immediate predecessor of i
To compute equilibrium probabilities, we multiply each of the equations defining
equilibrium defense investments by (1− xi) t obtain
xi(1− xi) = bi
∏
ki
(1− xk)qi = Uqi.












) if i /∈ ∆0 with k(i) the immediate predecessor of i
Let F (U) ≡
∑
i pi(U). Since, for every i, pi(U) is a strictly decreasing function,
F (U) is strictly decreasing. Hence the equation F (U) = 1 has at most one solution.
This concludes the proof of the theorem.
Proof of Proposition 2












) for j > i
Let


























































≤ 1, we have
F (bi) ≤ 1 < F (bi−1).
At an equilibrium, we must have F (U) = 1. The function F (U) is strictly decreas-
ing in U , and hence bi−1 < U ≤ bi. As bi−1 > U , for any target bj in the increasing
sequence with j > i, bj < U and hence bj /∈ ∆. As bi ≤ U , for any j ≥ i, 0 ≤ qj,
and hence every target j ≥ i is attacked with positive probability so that bj ∈ ∆,
completing the proof of the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Using equations (6), the defense investments of all targets in ∆ \∆0 except
for node j are unaffected by the addition of the new link ij as the immediate
predecessors of the targets remain the same as under the original network G. Now
consider how the addition of the link ij affects the function F (U) =
∑
i∈∆ qi(U),




i(U) denote the sum of probabilities after the change.
Recall that both F and F ′ are strictly decreasing functions of U and let U
′∗ and
U∗ be the values for which F ′(U) = 1 and F (U) = 1 respectively. We compute
F ′(U)− F (U) = q′j(U)− qj(U) =
(bk − bi)(bk + bi − bj)
b2jU
.
As bk > bi, if bk + bi − bj > 0, F ′(U) > F (U) for all U . But this implies
that U
′∗ > U∗, the attacker’s utility is higher after the addition of link ij. As U
increases, we use equations (4) to deduce that the equilibrium investments of all first
targets go down. Using equations (5) and (7), the equilibrium attack probabilities
of all nodes but node j go down, and hence as
∑
i qi = 1, the equilibrium attack
probability of node j increases.
If bi + bk < bj, F
′(U) < F (U) and similar arguments show that the equilibrium
attacker’s utility goes down, the defense investments of all first targets goes up,
and the equilibrium probabilities of all nodes but node j go up.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. All nodes l ∈ ∆ \ ∆0 keep the same immediate predecessor and hence the
same equilibrium defense investment. Now let F ′(U) denote the sum of probabilities
after the addition of the link 0i. A straightforward computation shows that












As opposed to the case of Proposition 3, the sign of F ′(U) − F (U) depends
on the value of U , and there is no necessary and sufficient condition on the target
values which allows us to sign F ′(U)−F (U). Let G(U) = U(bj −U)− (bj − bk)bk.
F ′(U) > F (U) if G(U) > 0 and F ′(U) < F (U) if G(U) < 0. Notice that G is a
concave function with G(0) = −(bj − bk)bk < 0 and G(bk) = 0. Clearly, there is
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no sufficient condition guaranteeing that G(U) > 0 for all U ∈ [0, bk]. A sufficient
condition for G(U) < 0 for all U ∈ [0, bk] is G′(bk) > 0, which is easily seen to be
equivalent to bj > 2bk.
Hence if bj > 2bk, F
′(U) < F (U) for all U ∈ [0, bk). If F ′(U) < F (U), as in the
proof of Proposition 3, the attacker’s equilibrium utility goes down, the equilibrium
investments of all first targets fo up, and the equilibrium probabilities of all nodes
but node i go up, implying that the probability of attack of node i goes down.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Consider the equations defining the equilibrium distribution over targets
and equilibrium defense investments, (4 - 8). From equations (6), xi goes up, xl
goes down and xj remains constant for any other j /∈ ∆0. Now let F (U) =
∑
i qi(U).






































> 0, then ∂U
∂bi
> 0. Next, we use equations (4) to deduce that xj
decreases for all j ∈ ∆0 and equations (5) to conclude that qj decreases for all
j ∈ ∆0 and (7) to show that qj decreases for all j /∈ ∆0 which is not equal to i
nor an immediate successor of i. While we conclude that the sum of probabilities
qi +
∑
li ql must go up, we cannot deduce whether pi goes up or not.
A similar reasoning gives the opposite result in the case where ∂F
∂bi
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 5, a change in bi does not affect the defense
investments of nodes in ∆ which are not immediate successors of i by equations
(6). Next, using equations (5) and (7), we compute
∂F
∂bi










Observe that, as opposed to the case of Proposition 5, the sign of ∂F
∂bi
depends
on the value of U . Hence there is no necessary and sufficient condition on the
target values under which the sign of ∂F
∂bi
can be established, and we look instead
for sufficient conditions.
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> 0. Then the function G(·) is a con-
















and G′(0) > 0 whenever
U > U∗. A sufficient condition for G(U) > 0 is thus that G(U∗) > 0. We verify













< 0. Then the function G(·) is an increasing
function of U with limU→0G(U) = −∞. In addition, as U ≤ minj∈∆ bj, U ≤ bi.







Once the sign of ∂F
∂bi
is established, we follow the same steps as in the proof
of Proposition 5 to compute the sign of ∂U
∂bi
and the comparative statics effects
of an increase in bi on the equilibrium investment levels of first targets different
from i and equilibrium attack probabilities for all nodes but i and its immediate
successors.
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Suppose not, and let the attacker use a mixed strategy q with a support of
at least two nodes.
First, we show that there is no branch in the tree containing two or more nodes
in the support of q. Suppose this is false, and there is indeed one such branch.
Without loss of generality, let {1, . . . , I − 1, I} be the set of targets on this branch.
Consider any node numbered k in the support. If node k + 1 observes the





qk+1 + qk+2 + ....+ qI
.





node k + 1 will intercept with probability xk+1 = q
′
k+1bk+1.
Consider node I. If the package is observed to have passed I − 1, I believes
with probability 1 that she is the target and will therefore intercept with xl = bl.














The two preceding equations give us
bI(1− bI) = bI−1
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since expected payoffs have to be equal for all points in the support. However,
this equation violates the first statement of Assumption 2. Therefore, I and I − 1
cannot both be in the support.
Second, suppose the support of q has a non-negative intersection with the sets
of nodes on two different branches of the tree. Let i and j be the last nodes to
be attacked on these branches. In view of the preceding argument, neither i nor
j can have predecessors that are attacked with positive probability. If the object
is detected at i, then i is the target with probability one. The expected payoff
to the attacker from sending the package to i is bi(1 − bi) . For similar reasons,
the expected payoff from sending the object to j is bj(1 − bj). For q to be an
equilibrium. we need
bi(1− bi) = bj(1− bj)
This violates the second statement of Assumption 2.
Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. We prove it by induction on K. The Lemma is clearly true if K = 2.
Suppose it is true for all increasing sequences up to length K − 1.
Let bi satisfy equations (9) and (10) for the truncated sequence (b1, b2, . . . , bK−1).
If bi ≥ ΠK−ik=1 (1− bi+k)bK , there is nothing to prove. Suppose, then that
ΠK−ik=1 (1− bi+k)bK > bi (13)
From the induction hypothesis,
bi ≥ ΠK−1−ik=1 (1− bi+k)bK−1 (14)
The last two equations give
(1− bK)bK ≥ bj∀j 6= K. (15)
it follows that equation (9) is satisfied. This completes the proof of the Lemma.
Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Sufficiency. Let i ∈ B = {1, . . . K} be a target that satisfies equations (9)
and (10) on B and (11).
In order to show that i can be supported as a sequential equilibrium target,
we need to construct one set of out-of-equilbrium beliefs that will rule out any
profitable deviation for the attacker.






k−1 for k = 2, . . . , K − i
βj = ε
|P (j,B′)|+1 for all j ∈ B′ 6= B
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Let the attacker choose to attack i. Then, if any j ∈ P (i, B) observes that the
object has reached its own location, it will believe that iis the target and will check








qj = 1 ∀j /∈ (P (i, B) ∪ {i} (16)
To show that the attacker’s strategy is optimal, we check for deviations.
Suppose j ∈ P (i, B). If the sender deviates and targets j, j does not check
since j is on the equilibrium path. However, equation (9) ensures that the sender
does not profit from the deviation.
Suppose j /∈ P (i, B). Then, use equations (10), (11) and (16) to conclude
that the sender does not profit from the deviation. Hence there is a sequential
equilibrium where node i is attacked.
Necessity. Consider first a node i ∈ B such that equation (9) fails and let j ∈
P (i, B) be such that bj > bi(1 − bi). If there is a sequential equilibrium where i
is attacked, node j does not choose any defense, and hence the attacker has an
incentive to deviate and attack node j, contradicting the fact that i is attacked in
equilibrium.
Suppose next that equation (10) fails for node i and let j ∈ S(i, B) be such that
Πk∈S(i,B)∩P (j,B)(1 − bk)bj > bi. Notice that for all k ∈ S(i, B) ∩ P (j, B), xk ≤ bk.
Hence the probability that the package arrives at node j is bounded above by
(1− bi)Πj−ik=1(1− bi+k). So by attacking node j, the attacker obtains at least
bj(1− bi)Πj−ik=1(1− bi+k) > bi(1− bi),
showing that this deviation is profitable, and contradicting the fact that i is at-
tacked in equilibrium.
Finally, suppose that equation (11) fails for node i ∈ B. Choose any B′ ∈ B
distinct from B and j ∈ B′. For any predecessor k of j (if any), xk ≤ bk and
xj ≤ bj. Hence, violation of equation (10) will again imply that the attacker can
profitably deviate from attacking i.
Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. Suppose the Lemma is false and for some i < n, yi+1 = yi + ε.
Suppose, first that ri > 0. Then, consider y
′
i = yi+1 and y
′
i+1 = yi. Then,
β′i < βi and β
′
i+1 = βi+1, while cost remains the same. Clearly, C gains.








. it is easy to check that C gains agains.
Proof of Proposition 7
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Proof. We first show that all equilibria must have the same support on the line.
Consider two equilibria with supports ∆ and ∆′.
Let m be such that bm > bi for all i 6= m. It is clear that m ∈ ∆∩∆′. Moreover,
no node (m+ k) ∈ ∆ since βmbm > βmbm+k. Similarly, (m+ k) /∈ ∆′. Hence, both
supports have the same final target m.
Now suppose that the equilibria have two different supports ∆ 6= ∆′. As the
two equilibria have the same final target, there exists a target l such that all targets
k ≥ l are in both supports ∆ and ∆′, and there exists a target i preceding l in ∆
which does not belong to ∆′ with no target between i and l in ∆′. We distinguish
between two cases: (i) there exists a target preceding l in ∆′ and (ii) there is no
target preceding l in ∆′.
Case 1. There exists a target preceding l in ∆′ Let j be the target preceding i
in ∆′. By construction j < i. Because there is no target between j and l in
∆′, bj = bl(1 − y′l)l−jbl. We also note that bj ≤
∏
j<k≤l(1 − yk)bl. Furthermore,
because yk ≥ yl for all k < l, and there exists a node i attacked between k and l,∏
j<k≤l(1− yk)bl < (1− yl)l−jbl. Hence
(1− y′l)l−j = bj < (1− yl)l−j,
so that y′l > yl. Finally, because i ∈ ∆ but i /∈ ∆′,
bi = (1− yl)l−ibl ≤ (1− y′l)l−ibl,
so that y′l ≤ yl, a contradiction.
Case 2. There is no target preceding l in ∆′. We then compute y′l as the solution
to the equation:
y′l = (1− y′l)l−1bl.
Similarly, letting j denote the first target attacked in ∆, we have




But as yj ≥ yk for all k > j with one strict inequality because there is at least one
target before l in ∆,
(1− yj)l−1 < yj < (1− yl)l−1bl.
As the function g(y) = y − (1 − y)l−1bl is increasing, we conclude that yj > y′l so
that
(1− yl)l−1bl > yj > y′l = (1− y′l)l−1bl,
showing that y′l > yl. But as i ∈ ∆ but i /∈ ∆′, y′l ≤ yl, a contradiction.
Finally, we show that for a fixed support ∆, there is a unique equilibrium attack
distribution. Let i = 1 be the first target. For any two consecutive targets i − 1
and i, let d(i) denote the length of the path between i and i− 1. The equilibrium
attack probabilities and defense investments can be computed as the solutions to
the system of equations:
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y1 = b1(1− y1)d(1)−1 (17)







(1− yk) for i ∈ ∆, i 6= 1 (19)∑
i
ri = 1. (20)
Notice that equations (17) and (18) uniquely determine the investment values
yi for all i ∈ ∆. Given the defense investments, equations (19) and (20) uniquely
determine the equilibrium attack probabilities ri for all i ∈ ∆, completing the proof
of the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. (i) Since Mi = −Ui, it follows that













= αiqibi + αi
∑
j∈∆,j>i
βjrjbj for i < n
= αiqibi for i = n
So,
Li = αiqibi(1− xi) +
x2i
2














for i = n
Using xi = yi = 1 − bi−1bi for i > 1, we get Mi > Li for i = 2, 3 . . . , n − 1 and
Mn = Ln.


















From the attacker’s equilibrium condition,
βci bi = β
c
jbj and βibi = βjbj for all i, j



























(1 + q21 − 2q1)
> 0 for all q1 ∈ (0, 1)
(iii) This follows straightaway since βcb1 = (1− b1)b1 < (1− q1b1)b1 = βb1.
44
Appendix B: Characterization of the support in
the cooperative model
Here, we characterize the support of A’s equilibrium attack strategy in
the cooperative model, as a function of the target values. Define ξi to
be the unique solution in [0, 1] to
bi(1− ξi)i−1 = ξi.










. Furthermore, if ξi <
(
1
)2, then ξi < ξj ⇔ ξi(1− ξi) < ξj(1− ξj).
Next, for any i, compute, for any j > i,






and let j∗(i) be the node with the highest value ζj(i).




j∗(i∗), ...., i∗m = j
∗(m−1)(i∗), with bi∗k > bj for all j > i
∗
m. The equilibrium support is
given by ∆ = {i∗1, i∗2, ....i∗m}.
Proof. We first prove that i∗ is the first target attacked in the support.
Suppose that the first node attacked satisfies i < i∗. Then i∗ ≥ 2 so that bi < 12
and hence ξi < frac12 for all i and ξi∗ > ξi for all i 6= i∗. Let i1, i2, ..., im be the
nodes attacked before i∗. We have yi1 = ξi1 < ξi∗ and, by Lemma 6 xij < xi1 for





∗−im > bi∗(1− ξ∗i )i
∗
.














∗−im > bi1(1− yi1),
showing that the attacker has an incentive to wait, skip all the nodes i1, .., i
m and
attack bi∗ as his first target. This contradiction shows that the attacker cannot
attack any node i < i∗ as a first target.




attacking 1, the attacker obtains b1(1− yi) = b1(1− ξi). As b1 > 12 > ξi,
b1(1− ξi) > ξi(1− ξi) = bi(1− ξi)i,














= ξi∗(1− ξi∗) > ξi(1− ξi) = bi(1− ξi)i,
so that the attacker has an incentive to deviate and attack node i∗. This argument
shows that the attacker cannot attack i > i∗ as a first target, completing the proof
that i∗ is the first target in the support.
Next, we prove that if i is attacked, the next target attacked must be j∗(i).
Suppose that the next target is j < j∗(i). Let j1, .., jm be the nodes attacked
between i and j∗(i). We have yj1 = ζj(i
1) < ζj∗(i) and by Lemma 6, yjk < yj1 for




∗(1)−jm > bj∗(i)(1− ζj∗(i)(i))j
∗(i)−i.
Now, by the definition of j∗(i),
bj∗(i)(1− ζj∗(i)(i))j





∗(1)−jm > bj∗(i)(1− ζj∗(i)(i))j
∗(i)−i = bi,
so that the attacker has an incentive to skip all nodes j1, ..., jm and attack j∗(i), a
contradiction which shows that the attacker cannot attack any node j < j∗(i) after
attacking node i.
Finally, suppose that the next target is j > j∗(i). Again, because ζj∗(i) > ζj,
bj∗(i)(1− ζj)j
∗(i)−i > bj∗(i)(1− ζj∗(i)(i))j
∗(i)−i = bi,
so that the attacker has an incentive to attack j∗(i). This shows that the attacker
must attack j∗(i) after attacking i, completing the proof of the Proposition.
46
